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HUMAN INGENUITY: A NOVEL 
STANDARD FOR PATENTING 
ALGORITHMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Twentieth Century draws to a close, society contin-
ues to understand and assimilate a new and powerful tech-
nology: computers. Computer technology has already 
revolutionized several industries and professions. l Now a 
multibillion dollar industry, its rapid expansion continues 
unabated.2 Its ever increasing intrusion into everyday life 
appears limitless, and commentators believe computer tech-
nology will usurp the present social structure.s 
Fear of misappropriation has caused many developers of 
computer technology to seek proprietary rights in their inven-
tions. 4 Intellectual property law has long provided the 
1. COMPETING VISIONS, COMPLEX REALITIES: SOCIAL AsPECTS OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 33 (J. Schement & L. Lievrouw eds. 1987) ("The convergence oftelecommu-
nications and computing technologies distribute information automation to the limits 
of the world's communication networks."); see also Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The 
Case against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program- Related 
In.vention.s, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1115 (1990) (programs known as Expert System 
Programs are presently used to make decisions in the fields of law, mathematics, 
medical diagnoses, meteorology, investment analysis, agriculture, and chemistry). 
2. United States based software sale was almost $29 billion in 1990: 20 percent above 
its 1989 level. The Unites States Department of Commerce projects an increase in 
sales of 20 percent in 1991 to almost $35 billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, U.S. INDuST'L . 
OUTLOOK, COMPUTER EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE 28-15 (1991). 
3. COMPETING VISIONS, COMPLEX REALITIES: SOCIAL AsPECTS OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 116 (J. Schement & L. Lievrouw eds. 1987) ("The increased access and con-
trol of information that computer technology creates will interact with material 
wealth to change the present social stratification."). 
4. R. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY' 1.03 (1985) ("commercial value 
coupled with relative ease of reproduction leads to substantial levels of unauthorized 
copying and distribution" of software); see also S. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, 
AND THE LAw, 160 (1984) ("Those with access to a system's program library can easily obtain 
copies for their own use or, more frequently, for resale to a competitor. Technical security 
measures ... are oflittle use .... "); J. VERGARI & V. SRUE, FuNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER 
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAw, §12.02 at 523-524 (1991) ("New [computer] technology and 
attempts by manufacturers and vendors to protect it have resulted in numerous cases 
involving the application of trade secret, patent, and copyright law ... to computer 
products and programs."); Kidwell, Software and Semiconductors: Why Are We 
Confused?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 533, 533 (1985) (explaining that both software and 
semiconductors are expensive to develop but inexpensive to duplicate). 
455 
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necessary protection. However, a critical area of computer 
technology, algorithms, remains unprotected.6 Construing the 
1952 Patent Act narrowly, the Supreme Court has adopted a 
per se rule against patenting algorithms. Applying this restric-
tive standard of patentability, the Court has determined that 
algorithms are like a law of nature and thus are not within the 
categories of patentable subject matter listed in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.6 
The Court seems to have stumbled in its approach to deter-
mine the patentability of algorithms by becoming trapped in 
a categorical quagmire. Yet, in other areas of patent law, the 
Court has developed standards to avoid categorical schemes. 
Adopting a less restrictive standard of patentability, the Court 
has developed a non-categorical approach to determine the 
patentability of biotechnological inventions. Decisions con-
cerning patents for living organisms provide the best example. 
Determining that living organisms were the result of dis-
covery and not invention, early patent law precluded them from 
patent protection. Categorizing such organisms as products of 
nature, the patent system adopted a per se rule against afford-
ing patent protection to these organisms regardless of the 
amount of human intervention required to reduce them to a 
useful product. 7 Modern biotechnology patent law now 
5. See M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw §39:7 (1985) (explaining that although it is 
left unprotected, Mthe algorithm is often the most important aspect of the program and 
that which its creator most wants to protect"); see also J. VERGARI & V. SHUE, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER HIGH·TECHNOLOGY LAW, §l2.02 at 523 (1991) (by pre· 
cluding Mideas, scientific discoveries, and mathematical formula" from patent pro· 
tection, the Court has left algorithms unpatentable); Chisum, The Patentability Of 
Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 960 (1986) (explaining that Mthe current state of 
the law is that 'mathematical' algorithms 'as such' or 'in the abstract' do not consti· 
tute patentable subject matter"). 
6. J. VERGARI & V. SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER HIGH·TECHNOLOGY LAw, 
§12.02(b)(1)(D) at 540 (1991) (algorithms are one of Mseveral court created exceptions 
to the statutory definition of patentable subject matter"); compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(1991) (provides that M[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process 
... may obtain a patent therefore"). The controversy centers around whether an algo-
rithm is a patentable process under the 1952 Patent Act. See generally infra notes 26-
64 and accompanying text. 
7. See Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'v 
23, 24-25 (1923) (MIt will be further seen from the decisions that plants and animal 
organisms ... are not the proper subject matter for patent protection" because they 
exist independent of human effort. (construing Wall v. Leck 66 F. 552 (9th Cir .. 
1895»; see cilso Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM'R PAT. 123 (this is the seminal case 
in which the patent office articulated its policy of precluding products of nature from 
patent protection). 
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recognizes that living organisms can constitute patentable 
subject matter if they are "a product of human inge-
nuity."8 
This Comment advocates that the Court afford patent pro-
tection to algorithms by adopting the standard of patent-
ability applied in biotechnology patent law: human ingenuity. 
Part II describes some fundamental aspects of computer tech-
nology. Part III discusses the current state of patent law con-
cerning patenting algorithms. Part IV demonstrates that the 
Court's restrictive standard of patentability is not consistent 
with case precedent. Part V describes how the Court's policy of 
precluding algorithms from patent protection subverts the 
patent system. Part VI explicates a standard of patentability, 
human ingenuity, and describes how this standard would 
return predictability to the patent system. 
II. LOGICAL EQUIVALENCY 
There are three distinct areas of computer technology: 
hardware, software, and algorithms. Hardware consists of 
physical devices: integrated circuits, video monitors, key-
boards, and wired interconnectors.9 Software, often found on 
punchcards, disks, magnetic tapes and various other media,10 
is a sequence of instructions that directs the Central Processing 
Unit (CPU) and other peripheral hardware in their respective 
8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty 447 U.S. 303, 309,100 S.Ct. 2204, 2208, 206 U.S.P.Q. 
193, 197 (1980); see Greenlee, Biotechnology Patent Law: Perspective of the First 
Seventeen Years, Prospective on the Ne:d Seventeen Years, 68 DEN. U.L. REV. 127, 128 
(1991) ("Courts, persuaded by evidence of the technical value added by the inventor's 
activities, have held materials isolated and purified from nature patentable:). 
9. M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 2:1 (1985) ("[H]ardware is what makes a dent 
in the floor when dropped .... Hardware does refer to the physical, the tangible, the 
more concrete-the machine portions of a computer system. -); see also, J. VERGARI & V. 
SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER-HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW, §l.Ol(c) at 6 (1991) 
(describing hardware as "all of the tangible physical parts that make up a computer"); 
see United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 
(1979) (hardware is the "tangible machinery of the computer-). 
10. A. TANNENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 11 (2d ed. 1984). 
There are several stages in the design of a program. At the programs inception, a pro-
grammer will create a block diagram or flow chart. This serves as an outline of.a spe-
cific series of steps that the program must perform to enable the computer to perform 
its task. At a stage subsequent to this, the program will be converted into a language 
that the computer can use, e.g., Basic, C, Pascal. Generally, it is these high level lan-
guages that are stored on magnetic media in the form of ones and zeros. See gener-
ally R. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TEcHNOLOGY' 1.03[2] (1985) (Nimmer explains 
the general process behind creating a program). 
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functions. ll Definitions of an algorithm vary from that of a 
"recipe, method, directions, and routine", 12 to a more formal def-
inition, adopted by the Supreme Court, of "an unambiguous, 
ordered sequence of steps that leads to the solution of a given 
problem."13 
Much of the confusion in computer related law results 
from the similarity of hardware, software, and algorithms. 1. 
"Any precisely defined algorithm ... may be realized in [both] 
hardware," and software. 16 No definitive rule exists that man-
dates which functions are manifested in hardware and which 
in software. Designers consider factors such as cost, speed, and 
reliability when deciding which functions to fabricate in either 
hardware or software. 16 For example on early computers the 
ADD instruction was originally executed through the use of 
hardware. 17 Present day programmable microcomputers (com-
monly known as PCs), perform this instruction through the use 
of software. 18 In effect because hardware and software can both 
express algorithms, they are logically equivalent. 
11. J. TREMBLAY & R. BUNT, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE: AN 
ALGORITHMIC ApPROACH 28 (1981); see also J. VERGARI & V. SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
COMPUTER HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAw, §1.02(c) at 7 (1991) (software is a "collection of com-
puter instruction sets that tell the hardware what to do; each set is called a program"). 
There are generally two types of computer programs: application programs, and 
operating system programs. Application programs are those that are designed to 
accomplish a specific task, e.g., WordPerfect(word processor), Lotus 1-2-3(spread-sheet), 
and Q-Modem(communications). Operating system programs enables the hardware 
to work synergistically, e.g., MS-DOS, 4DOS, UNIX. See id. at § 12.02(c)(1)(B), at 554. 
12. W. SAVITCH, TuRBO PASCAL 4.0/5.0 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ART AND SCIENCE 
OF PROGRAMMING 8 (1989). 
13. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 n.9, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1056 n.9, 209 
U.S.P.Q. 1,8 n.9 (1981); J. TREMBLAY & R. BUNT, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER 
SCIENCE: AN ALGORITHMIC APPROACH 35 (1981); see also Chisum, The Patentability of 
Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 974-977 (1986) (for an in depth analysis of the def-
inition of an algorithm). 
14. See M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 2:1 (1985); compare Davidson, Common 
Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1037, 1040-1041 (1986) ("Software inun-
dated the United States legal system with such force in such a short amount of time 
that it is surprising the confusion is not more rampant. Software was first thought of 
as patentable .•. then though of as not patentable: now it is considered as patentable 
again."). 
15. T. PRATT, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION 19 (2d ed. 
1983) ("Hardware and software lie on a continuum from the more concrete to the more 
abstract."); see also M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 40:1 (1985) ("[i]t is possible to build 
a chip which contains precisely those circuits which define [a] program"); W. SAVITCH, 
TuRBO PASCAL 4.0/5.0 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ~RT AND SCIENCE OF PROGRAMMING 8 
(1989) (describing a program as an algorithm expressed in computer language). 
16. A. TANNENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 11 (2d ed. 1984). 
17. [d. The ADD instruction is as it sounds. It adds binary numbers in the CPU. 
See infra note 30 for an explanation of binary numbers. 
18. A. TANNENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 11 (2d ed. 1984). 
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III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION VERSUS PATENT PROTECTION 
The Constitution empowers Congress to provide for the pro-
tection of computer technology.19 By classifying computer pro-
grams as literary works, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) extends copyright 
protection to the expression of the ideas contained in them.20 
Usually, hardware is not protected by copyright law because of 
its utilitarian qualities. 21 Patent protection is generally the 
appropriate means to protect proprietary interests in hardware. 
Patenting algorithms would have distinct advantages over 
copyrighting them. Unlike copyright law, patent law affords 
an inventor a monopoly which increases the patent holder's 
ability to license and market the technology.22 For an invention 
to be amenable to patent protection, it must demonstrate 
novelty, utility, and it must not be obvious.23 This standard of 
patentability was once thought to be a talisman: obviating 
the problems encountered by the patent office when deter-
mining the patentability of an invention.24 However, as this 
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... B). 
20. See, e.g., Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 
F.2d 1222, 1234, 230U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 488 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 
(1987) ("[Cjomputer programs are classified as literary works for the purposes of copy-
right. "); compare 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1991) (this statute describes the limitations on an 
owner's exclusive rights in computer programs). 
21. R. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY '11.02[3] (1985) ("Copyright 
does not extend to utilitarian aspects of objects."); compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991) (the 
subject matter of copyright protection shall not include "mechanical or utilitarian 
aspects"). Nimmer also explains that the utilitarian aspects of computer programs has 
made copyright protection of them awkward. See R. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY 'II 1.01 (1985). 
22. 35 U.S.C. § 154 ("Every patent ... shall grant to the patentee ... for the term 
of seventeen years ... the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States .... "); see L.J. KUTLEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
PROTECTIONILIABILITY/LAW/FORMS §3.02[5] (1988) (explaining that patent protection pro-
vides more clout in marketing an invention than copyright). 
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1991) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new an!! useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvemerit thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title."); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1991) (describes in detail the situations 
in which an invention will fail the novelty requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1991) ("A patent 
may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed ... if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art ... would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art .... "); see also Bailey, Progress as a Requirement to Patentability, 42 J. PAT. OFF. 
Soc'y 223 (1960) (this an excellent analysis of the requirements for patentability under 
the 1952 Patent Act). 
24. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text. 
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Comment shall show, this standard of patentability has varied 
depending upon the invention sought to be patented.26 
B. CASE LAW CONCERNING COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY PATENTS 
Patent cases involving algorithms have substantially con-
fused the modern standard of patentability. Gottschalk v. 
Benson was the first Supreme Court case to address the issue 
of patenting algorithms.ls There were two claims of a patent 
application in question: claims number 8 and 13. Claim num-
ber 8 described a method of storing binary coded signals in a 
re-entrant shift register.2? The application described claim 
number 13 as a "data processing method for converting 
binary coded decimal number representations into pure 
binary. "28 Taken together, the Court found that the two claims 
25. Gorenstein, The Dual Standard of Patentability: A New Look at the Computer 
Issue, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 96 (1980) (arguing that the standard of patentability applied 
is dependent upon the invention to be patented). 
26. 409 U.S. 63, 93 S.Ct. 253, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972); see Chisum, The 
Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 959, 972 (1986) (Chisum points out that 
Benson is the 'sole source of the aparrent rule against patenting algorithms'). 
27. Claim 8 reads: 
The method of converting signals from binary coded deciJ:nal form into binary 
which comprises the steps of 
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in are-entrant 
shift register, 
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, 
until there is a binary 1 in the second position of said register, 
(3) masking out said binary 1 in said second position of 
said register, 
(4) adding a binary 1 to the first position of said register, 
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions, 
(6) adding a 1 to said first position, and 
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions 
in preparation for a succeeding binary 1 in the second posi-
tion of said register. 
409 U.S. at 73-74, 93 S. Ct. at 258, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677. 
28. Claim 13 reads: 
A data processing method for converting binary coded 
decimal number representations into binary number repre-
sentations comprising the steps of 
(1) testing each binary digit position 'I', beginning with the 
least significant binary digit position, of the most significant 
decimal digit representation for a binary 0 or a binary '1'; 
(2) if a binary '0' is detected, repeating step (1) for the 
next least significant binary digit position of said most sig-
nificant decimal digit representation; 
(3) if a binary '1' is detected, adding a binary 'I' at the 
(i+1)th and (i+3) least significant binary digit positions of the 
next lesser significant decimal digit representation, and 
repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit 
position of said most significant decimal digit representation; 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss2/10
1992] HUMAN INGENUITY 461 
recited an algorithm for converting binary coded decimal num-
bers (BCD) into pure binary numbers.29 A binary coded deci-
mal (BCD) is an intermediate step between decimal numerals 
and binary numerals.30 
In his opinion, Justice Douglas considered whether the 
algorithm was a patentable process within the meaning of the 
1952 Act, but he never answered this inquiry.31 Refusing to deter-
mine whether the invention claimed demonstrated novelty, util-
ity, and nonobviousness, he found that the patentability of the 
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said 
most significant decimal digit representation, repeating 
steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser significant decimal 
digit representation as modified by the previous execution 
of steps (1) through (3); and 
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least 
significant decimal digit representation has been so processed. 
409 U.S. at 74,93 S. Ct. at 258-259, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677. 
29. Id. at 65, 93 S. Ct. at 254,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 674. 
30. The Court explained binary numbers as follows: 
The pure binary system of positional notation uses two sym-
bols as digits 0 and 1, placed in a numerical sequence with 
values based on consecutively ascending powers of 2. In 
pure binary notation, what would be the tens position is 
the twos position; what would be hundreds position is the· 
fours position; what would be the thousands position is the 
eights. Any decimal number from 0 to 10 can be represented 
in the binary system with four digits or positions as indicated 
in the following table. 
Shown as the sum of powers of2 
2" 2" 2' 2° 
Pure 
Decimal (8) (4) (2) (1) Binary 
0=0 +0 + 0 +0 =0000 
1 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 2° = 0001 
2 = 0 + 0 + 2' + 0 = 0010 
3 = 0 + 0 + 2' + 2° = OOll 
4 = 0 + 2" + 0 + 0 = 0100 
5 = 0 + 2" + 0 + 2° = 0101 
6 = 0 + 2" + 2' + 0 = OllO 
7 = 0 + 2" + 2' + 2° = 01ll 
8 = 2" + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1000 
9 = 2" + 0 + 2° + 0 = 1001 
10 = 2" + 0 + 2' + 0 = 1010 
The BCD System using decimal numerals replaces the char-
acter for each component decimal digit in the decimal numer-
al with the corresponding four-digit binary numeral, shown in 
the right-hand column of the table. Thus decimal 53 is rep-
resented as 0101 OOll in BCD, because decimal 5 is equal to 
binary 0101 and decimal 3 is equivalent to binary 0011. In pure 
binary notation, however, decimal 53 equals binary ll0101. 
Id. at 66-67, 93 S. Ct. at 255,175 U.S.P.Q. at 674-675. 
31. Id. at 64, 93 S. Ct. at 254,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 674; compare 35 U.S.C. 
§100(b) (1991) (defining a process as a "process, art, or method-). 
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invention was better left to Congress for resolution because 
the Court was not adequately equipped to render an opinion. 32 
In support of his deference to Congress, Justice Douglas found 
that the claim was unpatentable. Although his holding was con-
voluted, the author contends that Justice Douglas determined 
the claim reciting the algorithm was not amenable to patent pro-
tection because it failed to satisfy the requirements of section 
112.33 However, subsequent~ecisions have failed to demon-
strate a consistent interpretation of the Benson holding. 
Parker v. Flook,s· was the second case in which the Court 
addressed the patentability of a claim that recited an algo-
rithm.36 The patent at issue was for a process of updating 
alarm limits on a catalytic conversion ofhydrocarbons.36 The 
process contained three steps: measuring the value of the pro-
cess temperature; calculating the updated alarm-limit value 
through use of an algorithm; and adjusting the alarm limit to 
the updated value.37 
In his opinion, Justice Stevens interpreted Benson as 
holding that algorithms are not patentable per se.38 In sup-
port of this per se rule, Justice Stevens articulated the ratio-
nale that all algorithms were within the prior art, i.e., not 
32. See id. at 71-72, 93 S. Ct. at 258,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677. 
33. See infra notes 102-114 and accompanying text. 
34. 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1978). 
35. ld. at 586, 98 S. Ct. at 2523, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 195. 
36.ld. 
37. "Claim 1 of the patent describes the method as follows: 
'1. A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit 
on at least one process variable involved in a process com-
prising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons 
wherein said alarm limit has a current value of 
Bo+K 
'wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predeter-
mined alarm offset which comprises: 
'(I) Determining the present value of said process variable, 
said present value being defined as PVL; 
'(2) Determining a new alarm base Bl, using the following 
equation: 
Bl = Bo(1.0-F) + PVL(F) 
'where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and 
less than 1.0; 
'(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as 
B 1 + K; and thereafter 
'(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit 
value.-
ld. at 596-597, 98 S. Ct. at 2529,198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 200. 
38. ld. at 585, 98 S. Ct. at 2523, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 195. 
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new.39 Finding that the algorithm was the only element of the 
invention not used before in other catalytic conversions, he held 
the claim not proper for patent protection because it lacked nov-
elty.40 He went further and adopted a very hostile view toward 
patenting algorithms by declaring that Congress must act 
affirmatively before these types of inventions become amenable 
to patent protection.41 
The confusion concerning what standard of patentability to 
apply to computer technology patents began to manifest itself 
in the lower courts following the Flook decision. 42 With little 
guidance from the Supreme Court, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals developed a two-part test, the Freeman test, to 
determine if a claim, reciting an algorithm, was amenable to 
patent protection.43 Under this test, a court must first deter-
mine whether a claim recites an algorithm as defined in 
Benson.44 If such an algorithm is present, the next step is to 
determine if the claim "wholly preempted" the algorithm, and 
if it does, the claim is invalid.'6 Apparently, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals ignored the finding in Flook that 
all algorithms were part of prior art. 
39. Id. at 594,98 S. Ct. at 2527-2528,198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 199. This approach 
is often called the "point ofnoveltyB. For an analysis of this approach, see Comment, 
62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 521 (1980). The reader should note that the Court rejected this 
test for determining patentability in Diamond v. Diehr. See,infra note 59 and accom-
panying text. ' 
40. Id. at 594,98 S. Ct. at 2527-2528, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 199. 
41. Id. at 596, 98 S. Ct. at 2528, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 200 ("We would require 
a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, 
as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of 
public use narrower, than courts had previously thought.B (quoting Deepsouth Packing 
Co. v Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531, 92 S.Ct. 1700, 1708, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769, 
774))). 
42. Gorenstein, The Dual Standard of Patentability: A New Look at the Computer 
Issue, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 106-107 (1980) ("The inconsistency between PTO practice 
and the standards set forth in Flook indicates ... too restrictive a standard ... applied 
to innovations involving an algorithm. B). 
43. In re Freeman 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see 
also Goldberg, Patent Protection for Computer Processes and Computer Devices, C567 
A.L.I.-AB.A. 139 (1990) (speaking on behalf of the Patent Trademark Office). The Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals, was the only appellate court that reviewed decisions 
of patent examiners. Now the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals currently performs 
the duties of those of the now abolished Court of Customs arid Patent Appeals. See E. 
KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 771-772 (4th ed. 
1989). 
44. 573 F.2d at 1245, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 471. This prong of the test was prob-
ably a response by the C.C.P.A. to the dictum in Benson that explained how the 
claim in that case, if found patentable, would preempt the algorithm. See infra note 
109 and accompanying text. 
45. Id. at 1245, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 471. 
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The lower courts' disregard of the Flook decision continued 
in the decision of In re Walter.48 Here, the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals modified the second prong of the Freeman 
test. Abolishing the focus on preemption, the court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals articulated a standard of patentability for 
process patents radically different from that espoused in either 
Benson or Flook. The court here required that the invention, 
of which an algorithm is part, must be tangible in order for the 
claim to be the proper subject of a patent.4? 
Subsequent to the Walter decision, the Supreme Court 
rendered its most recent decision concerning the patenting of 
algorithms in Diamond v. Diehr.48 Relying on Benson, Justice 
Rehnquist expressly held that algorithms were not the prop-
er subject for patent protection because they were like a law 
of nature. 49 Justice Rehnquist specifically rejected the rea-
soning in Flook that algorithms were not patentable because 
they were not new.60 He asserted that "[t]he novelty of any ele-
ment or steps in a process ... is of no relevance in determin-
ing whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 
categories of possibly patentable subject matter. "51 
The claimed invention at issue in Diehr was a process for 
molding raw uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision 
products.52 Many steps in this process used an algorithm, the 
Arrhenius equation, to calculate the correct time to open the 
press. 53 The Court here distinguished this case from Benson 
46. 618 F.2d 758,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
47. Id. at 767, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406 (a claim containing a mathematical algo-
rithm would be patentable if the algorithm specifically dermed structural relationships 
between physical elements of an apparatus claim, or limited claim steps in a process 
claim). 
48. 450 U.S. 175, 101 S.Ct. 1048,209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981). 
49. Id. at 186, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (1981) ("We defined an 
'algorithm' as a 'procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem,' and we 
concluded that such an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, 
which cannot be the subject of a patent. "). 
50. Id. at 188-189, 101 S. Ct. at 1058, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 9. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 177 n.1, 101 S. Ct. at 1052 n.1, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 4 n.1 ("[AJ'cure' 
is obtained by mixing curing agents into the uncured polymer in advance of molding 
and then applying heat over a period of time. If the synthetic rubber is cured for the 
right length of time at the right temperature, it becomes a usable product. "). 
53. The language of the court is as follows: 
The equation is named after its discoverer Svante Arrhenius 
and has long been used to calculate the cure time in rubber-
molding presses. The equation can be expressed as follows: 
In v ... CZ + x 
10
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and Flook by finding that the invention here was applied to a pro-
cess. In his decision, Rehnquist stated that the patent was valid 
even though its claims recited an algorithm because the algorithm 
applied to a "process which ... [was] performing a function the 
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reduc-
ing an article to a different state or thing) .... "64 However, 
Rehnquist failed to articulate a standard by which the lower 
courts could determine whether an algorithm was applied in a 
process so that it would be amenable to patent protection. 
Shortly following the Diehr decision, the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals, in the decision of In re Abele, again mod-
ified the secorid prong of the Freeman test.66 The Abele decision 
permitted examining claims without the algorithm to determine 
if what remained was statutory subject matter.68 If what 
remained was statutory subject matter, the claim reciting the 
algorithm would be patentable only if the algorithm applied to 
a process step.67 Applying this analysis, an examiner or court 
would entirely omit an algorithm from consideration when 
determining whether a claim was patentable. The court, in 
Abele, found the claim at issue patentable because "absent 
the algorithm, the steps present would result in a conven-
tional CAT-scan process. "68 The algorithm was not used 
merely to solve a mathematical equation, rather it was incor-
porated into a larger process to produce an improved Cat-scan.69 
wherein In v is the natural logarithm of v, the total required 
cure time; C is the activation constant, a unique figure for each 
batch of each compound being molded, determined in accor-
dance with rheometer measurements of each batch; Z is the 
temperature in the mold; and x is a constant dependent on the 
geometry of the particular mold in the press. A rheometer is 
an instrument to measure flow of viscous substances. 
[d. at 177-178 n.2, 101 S. Ct. at 1058 n.2, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 4 n.2. 
54. See id. at 192, 101 S. Ct. at 1059-1060, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 10. This state-
ment can be interpreted as an implicit adoption, by the Supreme Court, of the phys-
icality requirement espoused in Walter. 
55. 684 F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
56. [d. at 907,214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 686. 
57. [d. 
58. [d. at 908, 214 U.$.P.Q. (BNA) at 687 (the algorithm was used merely to obtain 
a higher resolution CAT-scan thereby making images of internal organs and bones eas-
ier to recognize). 
59. The language of the court was as follows: 
The algorithm ... is merely applied to the Mattenuation 
dataW to eliminate what would otherwise appear as arti-
facts ... What appellants have done is to discover an appli-
cation of an algorithm to process steps which are themselves 
part of an overall process which is statutory. Hence, [the 
algorithm] cannot be construed as a mere procedure for 
solving a given mathematical problem. 
[d. at 908-909, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 688. 
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In re Grams provides the most recent ruling, from the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (formerly the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals), on a process claim reciting an 
algorithm.eo This decision left in a state of confusion, the test 
for determining whether a claim containing an algorithm is 
patentable. The process involved gathering data from a patient 
and using a computer algorithm to compare the gathered data 
with other pre-determined parameters and thereby deter-
mining if a patient's condition was abnorma1.61 The court found 
that the test articulated in Walter was no longer determinative 
for ascertaining whether a claim reciting an algorithm is 
patentable.62 Finding the claim unpatentable, the court opted 
for an ad hoc determination as to whether a claim reciting an 
algorithm was patentable.63 
The ad hoc standard of patentability applied by the lower 
courts in recent patent cases, is a result of the Supreme Court's 
departure, in Diehr, from the long established principal that 
the novelty and utility of an invention is the touchstone for 
determining its patentability. In adopting its approach of cat-
egorically precluding algorithms from patent protection,64 the 
Court in Diehr usurped 200 years of case precedent. Further, 
it has left in a state of confusion the proper standard of paten-
ability a court must apply. 
IV. CONFLICTS WITH TRADITIONAL PATENT LAW 
A. EARLY PATENT LAW 
Although Diehr asserted that novelty is irrelevant when 
determining patentable subject matter, an examination of the 
60. 888 F.2d 835,12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
61. Id. at 836, 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d at 1825. 
62. "[F]ailure to meet ... [the Walter] test does not necessarily doom the claim." 
Id. at 839, 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d at 1827. "The presence of a physical step in the claim 
to derive data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory." Id. at 840, 12 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d at 1828. 
63. Id. at 841, 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d at 1829. The court never clearly articulat-
ed its test for determining whether a claim containing a mathematical algorithm was 
patentable. see Note, The Return Of The Walter Test: Patentability Of Claims 
Containing Mathematical Algorithms After In re Grams, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 962 (1991) 
("After Grams, courts are left to make their own subjective determinations of what the 
applicants invented. "). 
64. See Chisum, The Patentability Of Algorithms, 47 U. PI'M'. L. REV. 959, 960 
(1986) (explaining "the current state of the law is that 'mathematical' algorithms 'as such' 
or 'in the abstract' do not constitute patentable subject matter"); see also Samuelson, 
Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer 
Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1095 (1990) ("[Without] emphasis ... 
placed on the industrial nature of Diehr's process it would not have been patentable."). 
12
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Patent System's history shows that this is incorrect. In 1790, 
Congress passed the first Patent Act (1790 Act).66 The 1790 Act 
established a permissive standard of patentability. To be 
amenable to patent protection, the Act stressed that an inven-
tion demonstrate novelty and utility.66 However, almost imme-
diately after the 1790 Act became law, the patent examiners 
established subsidiary requirements to further refine the stan-
dard. 67 Applying these requirements, the examiners preclud-
ed from patent protection inventions made in the 
following manner: a new use of an old invention, a new form or 
proportion of an old invention, an old invention made with a 
new material. 66 At a later time the examiners found it neces-
65. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1850), repealed by Act of Feb. 21, 1793 
. ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1850). 
66. [d. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That 
upon the petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary for the department of war. and the 
Attorney-General of the United States, setting forth that he, 
she, or they hath or have invented or discovered any useful art, 
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improve-
ment therein not before known or used, and praying that a 
patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful to 
and for the said Secretary of state, the Secretary for the 
department of war. and the Attorney-General, or any two of 
them, if they shall deem the invention of discovery sufficient· 
ly useful and important, to cause Letters of Patent to be made 
out in the name of the United States .... (emphasis added). 
67. This is probably attributable to the lack of guidance from the framers of the 
Constitution in elucidating exactly what types of inventions they intended to protect. 
See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y, 
5,17 (1966) (noting that shortly after the Committee of Detail's submission of the intel-
lectual property clause, on 5 September 1787, the Constitutional Convention adopt-
ed it without debate). 
68. The Department of State administered the 1790 Act. Under that Act, the 
Secretary of State, Secretary for the Department of War, and the AttorneyGeneral 
reviewed all patent applications. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-110 (1850), 
repealed by Act of Feb. 21, 1793 ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1850). It was Thomas Jefferson 
in his capacity a Secretary of State who was the motivation behind implementing the 
subsidiary requirements. See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 
48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y, 5, 26 (1966) ("The first 'board' [of patent examiners] comprised 
Thomas Jefferson, Henry Knox and Edmund Randolph, with Jefferson being the pri-
mary movant of the group."). 
Jefferson wrote: 
[T]hat a machine of which we were possessed, might be 
applied by every man to any use of which it is susceptible, and 
that this right ought not to be taken from him and given to 
a monopolist, because the first perhaps had occasion so to 
apply it. Thus a screw for crushing plaster might be 
employed for crushing corn- cobs. And a chain-pump for 
raising water might be used for raising wheat: this being 
merely a change of application. Another rule was that a change 
13
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sary to preclude a combination of known elements from patent 
protection.69 The task of examining patents quickly became over-
ly burdensome for the examiners.70 With the passing of the Patent 
Act of 1793 (1793 Act), Congress abolished the examination. 
The 1793 Act further lowered the standard of patent-
ability making patent protection more permissive than it was 
under the 1790 Act. It decreased the 1790 Act's utility require-
ment by abolishing the criteria that an invention be "suffi-
ciently useful and important."71 The act also codified the 
of material should not give title to a patent: As the making 
ofa ploughshare of cast rather than of wrought iron; a comb 
of iron instead of horn or of ivory, or the connecting buckets 
by a band ofleather rather than of hemp or iron. A third was 
that a mere change of form should give no right to a patent, 
as a high-quartered shoe instead of a low one: a round hat 
instead of a three-square: or a bucket instead of a round one. 
But for this rule, all the changes of fashion in dress would 
have been under the tax of patentees. 
Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155, 182-183 
(1989) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's letter of Aug. 13, 1813 to Isaac McPherson in VI 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181-82 (Washington ed. 1814». 
69. Jefferson wrote: 
[Ilf we have a right to use three things separately, I see 
nothing in reason, or in the patent law, which forbids our 
using them all together. A man has a right to use a saw, an 
axe, a plane separately: may he not combine their uses on the 
same piece of wood? 
Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 183 
(1989) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's letter of Jan. 16, 1814 to Oliver Evans in VI 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 298 (Washington ed. 1814». 
70. Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH.155, 
184 n.170 (1989) ("Jefferson indicated that because of an 'abundance' of applications 
and the requirement of examination, which required 'more time of the members of the 
board than they could spare from higher duties, the whole was turned over to the judi-
ciary, to be matured into a system, under which every one might know when his actions 
were safe and lawful." (quoting a letter to Isaac McPherson Aug. 13, 1813 in VI 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181-182 (Washington ed. 1814». 
71. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § I, 1 Stat. 318-321, repealed by Act of July 
4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1853) 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that 
when any person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of the 
United States, shall allege that he or they have invented any 
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, 
machine, manufacture, or composition or matter, not known 
or used before the application, and shall present a petition 
to the Secretary of State, signifying a desire of obtaining an 
exclusive property in the same, and praying that a patent 
may be granted therefore, it shall be made lawful for the said 
Secretary of State, to cause Letters of Patent to be made out 
... (emphasis added). 
14
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subsidiary requirement applied by the patent examiners under 
the 1790 Act that a patent would not issue for "simply chang-
ing the form or the proportions of any machine, or composition 
of matter. "72 Without the examination process, Congress left 
to the courts the task of determining what inventions were 
patentable. From the court decisions that followed, 
Commentators have found that the courts' principal inquiry for 
determining patentable subject matter was novelty.7s 
The courts interpreted the subsidiary requirements, applied 
by the patent examiners under the 1790 act, as a further 
refinement of the definintion of novelty.74 From the application 
of these subsidiary requirements, the Courts developed the 
Substantial Novelty test.76 Applying this test, the courts focused 
on the invention, and not the process that brought about its cre-
ation, to determine if novelty was present. 76 Under the 
72. [d. § 2. The statute read as follows: 
[T]hat any person who shall have discovered an improvement 
in the principle of any machine, or in the process of any com-
position of matter, which shall have obtained a patent for such 
improvement, he shall not be at liberty to use the improvement; 
And it is hereby enacted and declared, that simply changing the 
form or their proportions of any machine or composition of 
matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery. 
73. See T. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS, 59-
60 (2nd ed. 1822) (describing that novelty was a mitigating factor for determining 
whether an invention was patentable subject matter and that utility required only that 
an invention not be "frivolous and mischievous [sic]"); G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§ 16-17, at 15 (1st ed. 1849); see also 
Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 188 
(l989) ("Novelty is the proper first inquiry of the court in weighing patent validity. 
· .. " (construing Earle v. Sawyer 8 F.Cas. 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247); see, e.g., 
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F.Cas. 37,37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217) ("The law, however, 
does not look to the degree of utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of use, 
and that the use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance or prohibit."). 
74. G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 18, 
at 16 (lst ed. 1849) ("Our courts have, in truth, without using the same terms, 
applied [the subsidiary requirements when] determining whether alleged inventions 
· .. possess the necessary element of novel ty ."). 
75. See T. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS, 147 
(2nd ed. 1822) ("with regard to what constitutes the identity, or diversity of two machines 
· .. the material question, therefore, is ... whether the given effect is produced sub-
stantially by the same mode of operation and the same combination of powers on both 
machines"); Burchfiel, Revising the "Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155, 
195 (l989). See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the requirements that formed 
the basis for courts constructing the Substantial Novelty test. 
76. G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§ 16-
17, at 15 (lst ed. 1849 (explaining that it is the character and purposes of the inven-
tion that a court must examine to determine novelty and not the ingenuity of the 
inventor who created it); see Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155, 191 (1989) ("U]n the case ora machine, the proper inquiry is 
whether it has been 'substantially constructed before' and in the case of an improve-
ment, 'whether that improvement has ever been applied to such a machine before, or 
whether it is substantially a new combination.") 
15
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Substantial Novelty test, a device would fail as patentable 
subject matter if it performed SUbstantially the same function 
in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the 
same result as any invention in prior art.77 In effect, the 
courts required nothing more than an invention be new and 
useful to be subject to patent protection. Although the court 
managed to further refine the standard for patentability with 
the Substantial Novelty test, eradication of the patent exam-
ination made the 1793 Act ineffective.78 Congress repealed it 
with the Patent Act of 1836 (1836 Act). 
The 1836 Act demonstrated the Patent Systems adherence 
to a relatively permissive standard of patentability.79 It main-
tained the requirements for patentability that an invention 
need nothing more than to be new and useful, but it omitted the 
provision in the 1793 Act relating to change of form or propor-
tion.80 The belief being that this provision was redundant 
because it, as well as the other subsidiary requirements, applied 
by the patent examiners under the 179q Act, was subsumed with-
in the Substantial Novelty test. 81 Thus, under the 1836 Act, an 
invention need demonstrate no more than novelty and utility to 
be amenable to patent protection.82 All the patent acts subse-
quent to the 1836 Act, with the exception of the 1952 Act, pre-
served the standard of patentability espoused in the 1836 Act.8s 
77. See id. at 192. 
78. See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC'v, 5, 28 (1966) ("Duplications, frauds and frivolous patents were a problem. That 
Act also failed to provide the incentive to industry and economic growth .... "). 
79. This Act also established the Patent Office, and reinstituted the examination 
process for patents. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, revised by Act of July 8, 
1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1871). 
80. See Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original- Patent Cl~use, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 
155, 197 (1989) ("The provision relating to change of form or proportion was eliminated 
in the 1836 act .... "). 
81. See G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§ 
2-4, at 3-4 (1st ed. 1849); see also Burchfiel, Revising the "Original" Patent Clause, 2l1ARv. 
J.L. & TECH. 155, 196-202 (1989) ("[E]vidently [these subsidiary requirements were con-
sidered] as surplusage and without affecting the patentability standard, since the 
judiciary continued to apply it as implicit in the [S]ubstantial [N]ovelty requirement:). 
82. See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOc'v, 5, 31 (1966) ("[P]rior to 1850, the question of whether or not an invention was 
patentable was determined by the answer as to whether it was novel."). Some com-
mentators believed it necessary to abolish the provision in the 1793 Act that preclud-
ed granting patents to inventions that were merely a change of form and proportion. They 
believed that no precedent existed in patent law that substantiated any requirements 
for patent protection beyond that of novelty and utility. See G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 16, at 15 n.1 (1st ed. 1849). 
83. See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOc'v, 5, 30 (1966) (All statutes subsequent to the 1836 Act "preserved the essential 
requirements of'new and useful' ... until 1952 [when] Congress express[ed] a statutory 
16
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STANDARD OF PATENTABILITY 
Although the patent statutes maintained a standard of 
patentability that required a patentable invention to demon-
strate no more than novelty and utility, in the years before pas-
sage of the 1952 Act, the Court developed a more restrictive 
standard of patentability. Justice Nelson first articulated this 
standard for the Supreme Court in the 1850 Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood opinion.84 This standard became known as invention.86 
In Hotchkiss, the Court heard an appeal based on an objec-
tion to a trial judge's jury instruction that required the jury to 
determine a patent's validity based on ingenuity and not 
Substantial Novelty.86 The patent at issue was for the manu-
facture of knobs made from different types of clay and porce-
lain.87 Justice Nelson determined that" the only thing new [in 
the knob's manufacture] is the substitution of a knob of a dif-
ferent material from that heretofore used in connection with 
this arrangement. "88 He found that the trial judge's jury 
instruction was proper and refused to apply the Substantial 
Novelty test to determine the patentability of the claim. In his 
holding, Justice Nelson articulated that the degree of skill 
and ingenuity possessed by an ordinary mechanic was the 
proper threshold standard of patentability.89 This decision 
public policy of a standard for patentability."); see also Kitch, John Deere Co.: New 
Standard for Patents, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y, 237, 242 (1967) (describing that the prop-
er inquiry for determining patentability under the pre 1952 patent acts were novel-
ty and utility). 
84. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). 
85. A. WALKER, TEXT-BooK OF THE PATENT LAws OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
§ 23 (1885). In his book, Walker speaks ofthis test as a separate requirement inde-
pendent of the novelty and utility standards. Contemporary commentators continue 
to debate this topic. The author contends that this standard is not separate from nov-
elty and utility, but is a furhter refinement of novelty. See infra note 100. 
86. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 264. The trial jude instructed the jury as follows: 
[If] the knob of clay was simply the substitution of one 
material for another, the spindle and shank being the same 
as before in common use, and also the mode of connecting 
then by dovetail to the knob the same as before in common 
use, and no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the 
knob in this way that that possessed by an ordinary mechanic 
acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid, and the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to a verdict. 
87. 1d. at 264-265. 
88. 1d. at 265. 
89. See id. at 267. The heart of the majority's reasoning came from the following: 
Now if the foregoing view of the improvement claimed in this 
patent be correct ... unless [there were] more ingenuity and 
skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and 
17
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was not without its critics.90 Because Hotchkiss usurped estab-
lished patent law, it would be sixteen years before the courts 
would accept the test ofinvention.91 
Although the invention test enunciated in Hotchkiss was 
constitutionally dubious,92 the Court found the standard to 
be of such importance that it articulated a constitutional 
justification for it by the late 19th century.93 However, a strug-
gle ensued to establish a standard of patentability that includ-
ed the invention requirement. '" It was not until 1966 with the 
the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or 
porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechan-
ic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of 
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential 
elements of every invention (emphasis added). 
90. The dissenting justice construing several cases, English and American that refut-
ed the majority's reasoning, clearly articulates the usurpation,in patent law, caused by 
this decision. , "[i]t is thus apparent to my mind that the test adopted below for the pur-
pose to which it was applied, and which has just been sanctioned here, has not the coun-
tenance of precedent, either English or American; and, at the same time, it seems open 
to great looseness or uncertainty in practice.- 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 270. See Burchfiel, 
Revising the ·Original- Patent Clause, 2 lIARv. J.L. & TECH. 159 (1989) (the entire dis-
cussion of this article challenges the Court's adoption of this standard); Seidel, The 
Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'y, 5 (1966). 
91. See Burchfiel, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155,208 n.301 (1989) ("The first post-
Hotchkiss Supreme Court case to suggest that a patent was invalid on the basis that 
the difference between the invention and the prior art 'required no invention' and 
involved simply mechanical skill, which is not patentable.- (describing Simpson v. 
Woodman 77 U.S.(10 Wall.) 117 (1869))). 
92. See id. at 167 (explaining that the Continental Congress specifically reject-
ed Jefferson's proposal for higher levels of patentability beyond novelty and utility). 
93. See, e.g., Hollisterv. Benedict Mfg., 113 U.S. 59, 73, 5 S.Ct. 717, 724 (1885) 
(the machine "is but a display of the expected skill of the calling, and ... is in no sense 
the creative work of that ... which it is the purpose of the Constitution and the patent 
laws to encourage and reward-); Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11, 5 S.Ct. 1042, 
1047 (1884) ("[i]t is not enough that a thing shall be new ... and useful, but it must, 
under the Constitution and the statute, amount to an invention-). 
94. See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co., 340 
U.S. 147, 154, 71 S.Ct. 127, 131, (1950), reh'g denied 340 U.S. 918 (1951) (in their con-
currence, both Justice Douglas and Black opined that only patentable inventions were 
those which "serve the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, 
and the like ... [whereby] masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize 
it as an advance-); Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279, 64 S.Ct. 
593,594 (1944) (the Court found a patent invalid because the invention was "simple and 
such as should have been obvious to those who worked in the field .... -); Exhibit Supply 
Co., v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 138, 62 S.Ct. 513, 519 (1941) (in their dissent, 
both Justice Black and Douglas asserted that the standard of invention is subjective-
ly determined by the individual justice's views "[t]o call the device here an invention or 
discovery such as was contemplated by the Constitution or the statute is, in my judg-
ment, to degrade the meaning of those terms-); .cuno Engineering Corp. v. Atlantic 
Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91, 62 S.Ct. 37,41 (1941) (the Court, believing that an inven-
tion ·must reveal [a] flash of creative genius and not merely the skill- expected of a 
mechanic in the art, found a patent for a cigarette lighter invalid); see also Burchfiel, 
Revising the ·OriginaZ-Patent Clause, 2lIARv. J.L. & TECH. 159, 168 (1989) ([Before 1950] 
"the constitutional theory proposed ... was not expounded clearly.-). 
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decision of Graham v. John Deere CO.96 that the Court clearly 
established a standard of patentability that incorporated the 
invention requirement. 96 
Construing, for the first time, the new requirement 
espoused in section 103, of the 1952 Patent Act (1952 Act),B7 the 
Court, in Graham, determined that it "codif[ied] the ... prin-
ciple [asserted in] Hotchkiss v. Greenwood."98 Also, the Court 
expressly rejected arguments that the 1952 Act changed the 
standard ofpatentability.99 While the Court treated section 103 
as a separate and distinct requirement, many commentators 
have found that section 103 was simply a further refinement 
of what constituted novelty under the Act. loo Thus, it is clear 
from both the legislative history of the 1952 Act and the 
Graham decision that an invention's patentability was never 
to be determined by the restrictive standard now applied by the 
95. 383 U.S. 1,86 S.Ct. 684, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966). 
96. See Kitch, Graham II. John Deere Co.: New Standard for Patents, 49 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOc'y 237,299 (1967) (describing that the standard of patentability set fort by 
Deere under the 1952 Act Mpoints in the direction of ... returning patent law to the 
relative simplicity of the statute"). 
97. 35 U.S.C. § 103 
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described ... if the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would 
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made. 
98. 383 U.S. at 17,86 S. Ct. at 693,148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 466. The Court also 
defined a three-step factual determination for the obviousness of an invention. -Under 
§ 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between 
the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary 
skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or 
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined." Id. at 17, 86 S. Ct. at 694, 148 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 466. 
99. 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684,693, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 466 (1966» (MWe 
believe that this legislative history, as well as other sources, shows that the revision 
was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable invention.") 
(emphasis added). 
100. FEDERICO, COMMENTARY ON THE NEW PATENT ACT, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1,3 (1954) (MIn 
form [section 103] is a limitation on section 102 and it should more logically have been 
made part of section 102, but it was made a separate section to prevent 102 from becom-
ing too long and involved and because of its importance. "). Federico further stated, M[i]t 
has been recognized for well over a hundred years that not everything which is new is 
capable of being patented. The newness, that is the difference over what was previously 
known, must be sufficient in character, or in quantity, or in quality, in order that the new 
thing may be patented." Id. §3. The Court in Graham also recognized that the standard 
articulated in Hotchkiss was neCessary to determine whether an invention was novel. See 
383 U.S. 1, 16, 86 S.Ct. 684, 693, 148 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 459, 466 (1966). 
19
Brooks: Human Ingenuity
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
474 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:455 
courts to determine the patentability of claims containing 
algorithms. Rather, the standard of patentability the courts 
have traditionally required was that an invention merely 
demonstrate utility and novelty with novelty further defined 
by section 103.101 
~ PARADOXES CAUSED BY THE RESTRICTIVE 
STANDARD 
A. MISINTERPRETING GOTTSCHALK V. BENSON 
1. Douglas' Cryptic Analysis 
The author contends that the courts have consistently mis-
interpreted the holding of Gottschalk u. Benson and that 
Justice Douglas carefully crafted his opinion in order to main-
tain the statutory scheme for patent protection articulated 
in Graham while sustaining the efficiency of the patent office's 
examining procedures. Benson did not hold that algorithms 
were unpatentable per se. 102 In fact, the issue addressed by the 
Benson court, whether algorithms were patentable processes, 
was not the issue answered. 103 The gist of the Benson decision 
101. See 383 U.S. 1, 18,86 S.Ct. 684, 693, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 466 (1966). 
The exact language of the court is as follows: 
The [1952] Act sets out the conditions of patentability in three 
sections. An analysis of the structure of these three sections 
indicates that patentability is dependent upon three explic-
it conditions: novelty and utility as articulated and defined 
in §101 and § 102, and nonobviousness, the new statutory for-
mulation, as set out in § 103. The Court continues to state 
that "[wle believe that strict observance of the requirements 
laid down here will result in that uniformity and definiteness 
which Congress called for in the 1952 Act." (emphasis added). 
Diamond v. Diehr 450 U.S. 175, 182, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1054, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 6 
(1982) ("Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act ... inform us that Congress· 
intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by 
man." (quoting S.Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952))). 
102. 409 U.S. at 71, 93 S. Ct. at 257, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676 ("It is said that 
the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so 
hold."). 
103. Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms 
and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1057 n.102 
(1990) ("Nevertheless it is a curious fact ... that the [Benson] Court did not directly answer 
its own question"); see In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1395, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35, 38 
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (in a concurrign opinion, Justice Rich explained that the Court in 
Benson never decided whether the algorithm at issue was patentable subject matter); com-
pare In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237,1244,197 U.S.P.Q. 464, 470 (C. C.P.A. 1978) ("[T]hat 
computer programs are not patentable was neither the holding nor the 'thrust' of 
Benson."). 
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was that the patent in that case was invalid because it did 
not satisfy the disclosure requirements embodied in section 
112.104 
The caveat with the patent in Benson was the claims fail-
ure to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the 
claimed invention. lOG In his decision, Justice Douglas first 
noted that the claims of the patent "weren't limited to any par-
ticular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machin-
ery, or to any particular end use."l06 Justice Douglas continued 
to demonstrate the breadth of the claims by finding that they 
could be carried out with or without any machinery.l07 He 
found "the 'process' claim [was] so abstract and sweeping as to 
cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure 
binary conversion."lOS Finally, Justice Douglas held that the 
claims were too broad to be patentable because they "would 
wholly preempt the [algorithm]."l09 
Modern patent law has recognized that the enablement 
requirement of section 112 mandates that a patent specifica-
tion teach those of ordinary skill in the art how to make and 
use the invention without undue experimentation. 110 To further 
refine the rule, the Federal Circuit considers several factors in 
an undue experimentation analysis: 
104. 35 U.S.C. §112. Under section 112, an patent specification must contain the 
following: "a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process ofmak-
ing and using itb ; and the description must be "in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the sameb ; and these terms shall set forth 
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention (emphasis 
added). 
105. The issue of proper written description requirement of an invention arises 
mostly where claims not present in an application when filed are present thereafter. 
Bender, Disclosure Requirements for Software·Related Patents, 8 THE COMPUTER 
LAWYER (P-H) No. 10 (Oct. 1991). An issue concerning best mode disclosure usually 
arises after the patent has issued and is not generally considered by the Patent 
Office during the prosecution of a patent. See id. Neither of these situations arose in 
the Benson case. 
106. 409 U.S. at 63, 93 S. Ct. at 253, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 674. 
107. Id. at 67, S. Ct; at 255,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 675 ("The mathematical pro-
cedures can be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new machinery 
being necessary. And, as noted, they can also be performed [mentally] without a com-
puter. b ). 
108. Id. 409 U.S. at 68, 93 S. Ct. at 255, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 675. 
109. See id. at 72, S. Ct. at 257,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676. 
110. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736, 8 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1400, 1404 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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(1) the quantity of experimentation neces-
sary, 
(2) the amount of direction or guidance pre-
sented, 
(3) the presence or absence of working 
examples, 
(4) the nature of the invention, 
(5) the state of the prior art, 
(6) the relative skill of those in the art, 
(7) the predictability or unpredictability of 
the art, and 
(8) the breadth of the claims.1l1 
The Federal Circuit has determined that these factors are illus-
trative.112 However, case precedent shows that overly broad claims 
within a patent application have often caused a court to find a 
patent invalid under section 112.113 From the fore-
going discussion it becomes clear that Justice Douglas' analysis in 
Benson corresponds more to an issue involving section 112 rather 
than section 101.114 Thus, reliance on Benson as holding that 
algorithms are not patentable subject matter is dubious at best. 
111. Id. 
112. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 
1213, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is not necessary that a 
court review all the Wands factors to find a disc:losure enabling."). 
113. See, e.g., Dolbear v. American Bell Tel., 126 U.S. 1, 154,8 S. Ct. 778, (1888) 
(distinguishing this case from Morse, the Court here found the patent valid because 
it was not for the use of a electricity in its natural state, but for using it in a specified 
condition)j O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62,118·119 (1853) (where the Court 
invalidated a process patent whereby the patentee sought to obtain the exc:lusive right 
to the process of transmitting ·intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance 
invalid because it was too broad and did not specify any specific machine that would 
enable a person skilled in the art to make or use the machine)j Wyeth v. Stone, 30 
F.Cas. 723,727 (1840 C.C.D. Mass.) (No. 18,107) (which c:learly articulates the rule 
invalidating patents on claims so broad as to be abstract by finding invalid a patent 
issued for an ice cutting machine because it was for an abstract principle since "the 
patentee failed to describe the means used to cut the ice")j Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1016, 1028 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (construing an appeal from a lower court's decision, the Federal 
Circuit found "no error in the court's conclusion that the generic DNA sequence 
claims are invalid under Section 112" because they were overly broad)jIn re Wands, 
858 F.2d 731, 740, 8 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1400, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (in her dissent, 
Justice Newman argued in favor of supporting the Patent Board's rejection of the patent 
on the grounds that it was overly broad within the meaning of section 112). 
114. This would coincide with Congress' findings that natural phenomenon 
were not subject to patent protection because they were thought not to be amenable 
to the written description requirement. See, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
312, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2209, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 198 (1980) (An ·obstac:le to 
patent protection for plants was the fact that they were thought not amenable to the 
'written description' requirement of the patent law." (construing H.R. 11372, 71st Cong., 
2d Sess, 7 (1930))). Compare Bruzga, A Review of the Benson·Flook-Diehr 
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2. Protecting The Graham Analysis 
Justice Douglas addressed another issue in the Benson 
decision: whether the PTO could effectively examine patent 
applications containing claims for algorithms. The Court 
quoted, at length, three paragraphs from the Report of the 
President's Commission on the Patent System. 116 This report 
prompted reservations concerning the PTO's ability to cope 
administratively with computer related patent applications."lls 
The Commission's findings were as follows: 
The Patent Office now cannot examine appli-
cations for [computer related technology] 
because of the lack of classification tech-
nique and the requisite search files. Even if 
these were available, reliable searches would 
not be feasible or economic because of the 
tremendous volume of prior art being 
generated. Without this search, the patent-
ing of [computer related technology] would 
be tantamount to mere registration and the 
presumption of validity would be all but 
nonexistent (emphasis added).1l7 
Trilogy: Can the ·Subject Matter" Validity of Patent Claims Reciting Mathematical 
Formulae Be Determined Under 35 U.S.C. Section 1121, 69 J. PAT. OFF. SOOty, 197 
(1987) (in this article this author puts forth a theory that explains the Court's failure 
to find mathematical formula patentable because often the claims reciting them are 
too abstract); Cf. Meyer, Utility Requirement in the Statute, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Sooty, 533, 
534 (1967) (explaining that the written description requirement of section 112 is essen-
tial in order for an invention to demonstrate utility). 
115. The paragraphs quoted were: 
"Uncertainty now exists as to whether the statute permits a 
valid patent to be granted on programs. Indirect attempts 
to obtain patents ... should not be permitted. 
"The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for pro-
grams because of a lack of a classification technique ... the 
patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere regis-
tration and the presumption of validity would be all but 
nonexistent. 
"It is noted ... that copyright protection for programs is 
presently available.· 
409 U.S. at 72, 93 S.Ct. at 257-258, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677 (quoting To Promote 
the Progress of ... Useful Arts, Report of the President's Commission on the Patent 
System, 6 (1966». 
116. See id. 
117. To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS 
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, 6 at 13 (1966). 
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The Court impliedly accepted the Commission's findings when 
it deferred to legislative action for the resolution of whether 
computer algorithms should be patentable. 118 
The Commission's concern that patenting would become 
mere registration is understandable considering the 1793 Act 
was such a system and proved unworkable. 119 The Supreme 
Court's resistance to patenting an invention for which no prior 
art could be examined is understandable considering the Court 
had just concluded 116 years of labor in articulating a workable 
test for determining patentable subject matter that focused 
upon analyzing prior art.120 Preserving the statutory scheme 
articulated in the Graham decision was a major consideration 
in the reasoning of the Benson decision. However, the problems 
raised by the Commission are no longer present today. 
The Patent Trademark Office recently completed an auto-
mated patent search system as a part of an automation effort 
begun in 1980.121 They have taken steps to facilitate searching 
for prior art by reclassifying subclasses of computer-related 
technology so that people with computer related backgrounds 
can explore prior art more proficiently.122 Because the problems 
that were present when the Court rendered its Benson decision 
are no longer present, the Court should limit Benson to the facts 
of that case. 
B. THE INFRINGEMENT DILEMMA. 
The present failure of the Court to recognize proprietary 
rights in algorithms has caused lower courts to undermine 
many existing patents. This has become increasingly appar-
ent in actions for infringement. Determining infringemenhs 
a two-step process: the court must ascertain the scope of the 
claim reciting the infringed device and determine if that claim 
encompasses the alleged infringing device, then it must deter-
mine if either literal infringement or infringement under the 
118. See 409 U.S. at 73, 93 S.Ct. at 258, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676-677 ("It may 
be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these [algorithms], a policy mat-
ter to which we are not competent to speak ... action by the Congress is needed. "). 
119. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text. 
121. 137 CONGo REC. S 3,939, S23,940 (1991) (Senator Roth introducting the 
Patent Information Dissemination Act of 1991). 
122. Bender, Current Developments In Software Patents, 298 P.L.!. PAT 379, 397 
(1990). 
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doctrine of equivalents is present.123 "Literal infringement requires 
that the accused device embody every element of the claim."I24 If 
the accused device does not infringe literally, it may still infringe 
under the Doctrine of Equivalents if it "work[s] in substantial-
ly the same way, and accomplish[es] substantially the same 
result ... even though they differ in name, form, or shape. "126 
Computer technology added a twist to patent protection 
because of the technology's logical equivalency. Gemignani pro-
vides the clearest example: 
If a mechanical device were built to invert 
matrices, it would be patentable subject mat-
ter as a machine ... [C]all it MIM (matrix 
inverting machine). If a program were writ-
ten to invert matrices using the same algo-
rithm employed in the design of the MIM, the 
program would convert a computer which it 
was running into a virtual MIM.I26 
The result is that any inventor could subvert the mechanical MIM 
by simply writing a program containing the same algorithm. 127 
Recently, a Federal District Court addressed an infringe-
ment issue similar to Gemignani's example in Allen-Bradley Co. 
v. Autotech Corp .. 128 Autotech sued Allen-Bradley for infringe-
ment of its process control computer.129 This case found that for 
the purposes of infringement, a program stored in a Read 
Only Memory (ROM), is different from that stored in a Random 
Access Memory (RAM).130 The court found no literal infringe-
123. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co. 793 F.2d 
1279, 1282, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
124. Builders Concrete, Inc., v. Bremerton Concrete Products Co., 757 F.2d 
255,257,225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 240, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
125. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 
854,94 L.Ed. 1097,85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328 (1950). 
126. See M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 42:31 (1985). 
127. See id. 
128. No. 86-C8514, 1989 WL 39795 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1989). 
129. "A programmable controller is a type of computer system designed partic-
ularly for use in a factory environment to direct the function of other machines. For 
example, a programmable controller can be used to control presses, drills, lathes and 
direct the functions of robots in the manufacturing process.ld. at .1. 
130. See id. at ·2. The court described the difference between the two types of 
memories as follows: 
The distinction between [ROM] and [RAM] The tasks 
performed by the programmable controllers are, of course, 
programmed into the machines. This program of instruction 
25
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ment because the accused device did not contain every element 
of the protected device, i.e., one device contained a RAM and the 
other contained a ROM.131 Furthermore, the court found no 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because one 
could not modify the program in the ROM of the patented device 
whereas the program in the RAM of the accused device was eas-
ily modified. 132 In spite of the fact that both programs, in their 
respective memories, may be logically equivalent, the court 
failed to protect Autotech's device from infringement. As one 
commentator explained "[t]his case is either an object lesson in 
how to write a claim involving software-do not restrict a program 
to being executed in a ROM-or it is a failure by a court to under-
stand" the logical equivalency of computer-technology. 133 This 
decision is a quintessential example of the problems facing 
patent law until proprietary rights in algorithms are reorganized. 
C. UNPREDICTABILITY IN THE PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE 
The present practices of the PTO are not consistent with its 
policies. The patent office asserts that they do not patent 
"mere computer programs or mathematical formulas. "134 
However, a survey taken from July 1, 1987 to December 31, 
1987 discovered that the Patent Trademark Office had issued 
1.65 software patents per week. 13G Often these claims were 
(designated by Allen-Bradley as the ·user control program") 
is stored in the memory of the programmable controller. in 
which this program can be stored, but for purposes of this 
motion only two are material. The [ROM] used in the Autotech 
patent is generally programmed a single time. When the 
instruction program is located in [ROM] the programmable 
controller ... can only read the instructions from the memo-
ry; the user cannot easily write new instructions into the mem-
ory .... The key feature of read-only memory is its 
non-volatility: in the event of a power outage, the instruction 
program is not lost. The [RAM] contained in the Allen-Bradley 
invention, by contrast, allows the instruction program to be 
altered, edited or rewritten an unlimited amount of times at 
the discretion of the user. . .. The chief disadvantage of 
[RAM] is its volatility; i.e., the information that is stored in 
a [RAM] can be lost in the event of a power outage. 
131. The court stated, ·[b]ecause of the fundamental difference in the type ofmem-
ory in which the instruction is stored and from which the instruction program is exe-
cuted between [the accused patent and the protected one], there is no literal 
infringement." 1d. at -4. 
132. 1d. at -5. 
133. See M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 42:28 n.17.1 (Supp. 1991). 
134. Goldberg, Patent Protection for Computer Processes and Computer Devices, 
C567 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 139 (1990). (speaking on behalf of the Patent Trademark Office). 
135. Syrowik, Patent Protection for Software Technology-A Powerful New Form 
of Protection, 67 MICH. B.J. 968, 968 (1988). 
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broad enough not only to cover the program code, but also to 
include the underlying algorithm. 138 Further, the PTO has 
issued five patents for algorithms since 1987.137 One of the 
patents, the Karmarkar algorithm, is similar to one which the 
C.C.P.A. previously held unpatentable. 13s Often, when the 
patent office had issued a patent for an algorithm, it was given 
under the deceptive description of a Computer and a Method. 139 
However, in light of recent decisions concerning infringement, 
the protection expected for these patents is minimal at best. 
The author believes that the combined effect of the infringe-
ment actions and the practices of the PTO will seriously under-
mine the integrity of the patent system. Although one is given 
exclusive rights in a patent,140 registering an invention with the 
PTO ensures that sufficient information will be available so 
that those who wish to develop the algorithm can do SO.141 
However, the courts have clearly shown that they will not 
recognize a proprietary right in an algorithm. 142 It will not be 
long before inventors realize that there exists little incentive 
to bring forth, to the PTO, useful inventions when the court will 
fail to uphold the patents. 
VI. A SUPERIOR STANDARD OF PATENTABILITY: 
HUMAN INGENUITY 
A. LAWS OF NATURE AND NATURAL PHENOMENON 
The problems arising from the current policy toward patent-
ing algorithms demonstrate a need for fundamental change in 
136. Id .. 
137. Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection For 
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1100 
(1990) (citing N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D1, col. 4.). The patents are the 1989 
Duhamel patent for a method of performing discrete cosine transformation (4,797,847) 
the 1989 Eastman Kodak patent for a system incorporating an error tolerant com-
pression algorithm (No. 4,797,729), the 1988 Karmarkar algorithm (No. 4,744,028), 
the 1988 TRW patent for squared radix discrete Fourier transform algorithm (No. 
4,768,159), and the 1987 Bracewell fast fourier transform (No. 4,646,256). Id. at n.282. 
138. [d .. 
139. See 1075 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 2236 (1987) (Pat. No. 4,646,256, issued Feb. 
24, 1987). This was the Bracewell Fourier Transform. This is a sophisticated signal 
processing algorithm that enables computer to process certain calculations at twice 
the speed regardless of the hardware. 
140. See supra note 22. 
141. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("A [patent] specification shall contain a written description 
of the invention ... in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any per-
son skilled in the art to ... carry out [the] invention"). 
142. See generally supra notes 26-64 and accompanying text. 
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the Court's standard of patentability. The Court should abol-
ish its per se rule against patenting certain inventions, as it did 
with biotechnology patents. Instead, it should focus on whether 
there has been human intervention in the development of the 
algorithm to determine its patentability. 
The traditional rule that living organisms were not the 
proper subject for patent protection derives from late Nineteenth 
Century patent law. '48 This rule was probably a misinterpreta-
tion of the rule de;rived from LeRoy v. Tatham,'44 that "[p]henom-
ena of nature are not the proper subject for patent protection. "145 
In Tatham the patent at issue claimed novelty not in the mechan-
ical parts, which were previously known, but in the process of 
manufacturing lead pipes with a combination of heat and pres-
sure. l46 The Tatham court stated, "a principle, in the abstract, 
is a fundamental truth ... and cannot be patented .... ,"147 but 
the Court qualified that rule by stating that a law of nature may 
be the proper subject of a patent if applied to a new and useful 
result.l46 ~ubsequent decisions attempted to develop a standard 
to determine when a phenomena of nature was the proper sub-
ject of a patent. 149 However, the Court never clearly defined a 
standard, and the rule against patenting phenomena of nature 
was applied indiscriminately. 
143. See, Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 
23,24 (1923) ("[P]lants ... even though very valuable uses may be discovered for them, 
or that they may have been obtained by the aid of scientific management in their prop-
agation ... are not discoveries which are subject to patentable protection." (constru-
ing Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM'R PAT. 123». 
144. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853). 
145. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1056, 209 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 89 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 2525, 
198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S. Ct. 253, 
255, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 675 (1972). All three of these cases cite Tatham as hold-
ing that phenomena of nature are not the proper subject for patent protection. 
146. Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174 (1853). 
147. 1d. at 175. The Court explained that a process, embodying a law of nature, 
"must be stated with such precision as to enable an ordinary mechanic to construct and 
apply the necessary process." Thus, the principle would no longer be in the abstract. 
148. 1d. ("A patent will be good though the subject of the patent consists ... of a 
... law of nature if that principle is ... applied to ... a practical result and benefit not 
previously attained." (quoting the English case of Househill v. Nielson, Webster's 
Patent Cases 683». It is apparent from the Court interchanging the use of the phrase 
"phenomena of nature" with the phrase "law of nature" and vice versa, that a law of 
nature is a subset of the greater category of pohenomena of nature, i.e., a law of nature 
is a phenomena of nature, but a phenomena of nature is not necessarily a law of nature. 
149. In patents containing claims for apparatuses, the Court has found that "a 
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, 
but a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth 
may be." See Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 
94,59 S. Ct. 427, 431 (1939) (this case sustained the validity ofa patent that granted 
the patent holder the exclusive right to manufacture antennas designed to the 
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This rule reached its zenith in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co . . 160. Here, the Court reviewed a district 
court's invalidation of a patent for various bacteria of the 
genus Rhizobium. 161 Although the Court found the product 
highly useful,162 Justice Douglas held that the invention was 
not patentable because the inventor created a compound that 
merely embodied the natural qualities of the bacteria.163 
B. THE HUMAN INGENUITY TEST 
More recently, the Court has developed a test to deter-
mine whether an invention that embodies natural qualities may 
be the subject of a patent. 164 For example, in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty/56 a divided Court upheld a patent for a living 
microorganism into which the inventor had introduced multiple 
naturally occurring bacterial plasmids. l66 The Court rejected 
the PTO's argument that living organisms are not patentable 
and held that a living, genetically altered, organism may' qual-
ify for patent protection as a new "manufacture" or "composi-
tion of matter" under section 101 of the Patent Act.167 
Recognizing that the categories of patentable subject matter 
specifications of a mathematical formula); see also, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 
333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S. Ct. 440, 441 (explaining that one may obtain a patent on a nat-
ural phenomenon only ifit one applies it to a new and useful end). 
In patent applications containing process claims, the Court has found that phe-
nomena of nature, used in a specified manner, will be the proper subject of a patent. 
See Dolbear v. American Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1,533,8 S.Ct. 778, 781 (1888) ("In the 
present case the claim is not for the use of a current of electricity in its natural state 
as it comes from the battery, but for putting a continuous current, in a closed circuit, 
into a certain specified condition, suited to the transmission of vocal and other 
sounds, and using it in that condition for that purpose." (emphasis added». 
·150. 333 U.S. 127,68 S. Ct. 440 (1948). 
151. Id. at 128-129, 68 S. Ct. at 440. These bacteria, when fixed to the roots of 
certain leguminous plants, enabled those plants to fix nitrogen from the air. 
152. [d. at 131, 68 S. Ct. at 442. The Caveat was that out of the six Rhizobium 
species, no one species would be effective on the roots of all species of leguminous 
plants. The patentee discovered a certain mixture of these bacteria that would work 
on all leguminous plants without side adverse side-effects. 
153. Id. ("The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in 
the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility ... The 
bacteria perform in their natural way ... They serve the ends nature originally pro-
vided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee)." 
154. See, Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721 (1990) 
([Recent] "case law does not deny patent protection to all inventions composed of nat-
urally occurring products or manifesting laws of nature. Instead, the cases suggest 
that the patentability of such inventions turns on whether the claimed invention is 
a new product or process resulting from human intervention .... "). 
155. 447 U.S. 303,100 S. Ct. 2204, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980). 
156. For an analysis of this invention, see infra notes 163-168 and accompany-
ing text. 
157. [d. at 311,100 S. Ct. at 2208-2209, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 198 (1980). 
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listed in section 101 were not exhaustive/58 the Court adopt-
ed a broad construction of the statute. In support of this 
broad construction, the Court quoted language from the 
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act to show 
that Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include 
anything under the sun that is made by man."159 As a result of 
Chakrabarty, the PTO uses human ingenuity as the touchstone 
for determining the patentability of claims reciting biotech-
nological inventions. l60 
In Chakrabarty, Chief Justice Burger recognized two fac-
tors as determinative when finding human ingenuity present 
in an invention: the inventions utility, and its character.161 It 
is unlikely that the Court considered the utility of the inven-
tion as a controlling factor for finding human ingenuity because 
the Court had previously held that the most useful of natural 
elements are not the proper subject of a patent. lS2 Undoubtedly, 
the principal inquiry here was the character of the invention. 
Examining Chakrabarty's invention, one finds that it con-
sisted of a bacteria capable of degrading four main compo-
nents of crude oil. ls3 While there were no known naturally 
occurring bacteria that could perform this task, there were four 
158. Id. at 316, 100 S. Ct. at 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at (MCongress employed broad 
general language in drafting section 101 precisely because ... inventions are often 
unforseeable. "). 
159. ld. at 308,100 S. Ct. at 2208-2209, 206 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 197 (1980) (The 
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statu-
tory subject matter to -include anything under the sun that is made by man." 
S.Rep.No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R.Rep.No.1923. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 
6 (1952) (footnote omitted). 
160. See, Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1425, 1426 (1987) (MThe issue, in 
our view, in determining whether the claimed subject matter is patentable under 
Section 101 is simply whether that subject matter is made by man"); Ex parte Hibberd, 
227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (1985) (the Board of Patent Appeals held that non-naturally occur-
ring, multicellular living plants were patentable subject matter under § 101). 
161. Burger stated: 
Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bac-
terium with markedly different characteristics from any 
found in nature and one having the potential for signifi-
cant utility. His discovery is not nature' handiwork, but his 
own .... 
447 U.S. at 310,100 S. Ct. at 2208, 206 U.S.P.Q. (RNA) at 197. 
162. See, Thome, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 
23,24; Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM'R. PAT. 123, 127. . 
163. 1981 Chakrabarty Patent for Microorganisms Having Multiple Compatible 
Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids (No.4,259,444); see also Application of 
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 968, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 197 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 
303 (1981) (the purpose of this new bacteria was destroy maritime oil slicks by dis-
solving components of the oil into substances that would serve as food for fish). 
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bacteria that could break-down anyone of the components of 
the crude oil. l64 From these four bacteria, Chakrabarty isolated 
the plasmid that enabled the bacteria to degrade the crude oil. 165 
These plasmids consist of double-stranded DNA (deoxyri-
bonucleic acid) molecules: products of nature that are 
organized in a definitive complex structure.166 Chakrabarty's 
invention consisted of organizing the genetic sequence of the 
plasmids so as to make them compatible with both each other, 
and the bacteria that would act as the host cell for the 
plasmids. 167 Although the invention consisted of a combination 
of naturally occurring elements, the Court recognized this 
combination of naturally occurring elements to form a useful 
invention for society as a product of ingenuity.16B 
C. ALGORITHMS: A PRODUCT OF HUMAN INGENUITY 
Given the Court's willingness to interpret section 101 
broadly for biotechnology patents, the Court should extend this 
164. Chakrabarty described the disadvantages of using the existing bacteria as 
foliows: 
However, since bacterial strains differ from one another in 
a) their rates of growth on the various hydrocarbon compo-
nents, b) nutritional requirements, production of antibiotics 
or other toxic material, and c) requisite pH, temperature and 
mineral salts, the use of a mixed culture leads to the ultimate 
survival of but a portion of the initial collection of bacterial 
strains. As a result, when a mixed culture of hydrocarbon-
degrading bacteria are deposited on a oil spill the bulk of the 
oil often remains unattached for a long period of time (weeks) 
and is free to spread or sink. 
1981 Chakrabarty Patent for Microorganisms Having Multiple Compatible Degradative 
Energy-Generating Plasmids (No.4,259,444); see also Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 
952,968,201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 197 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 303 (1981). 
165. 1981 Chakrabarty Patent for Microorganisms Having Multiple Compatible 
Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids (No.4,259,444); see also Application of 
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 968, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 197 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 
303 (1981). 
166. "The structure [of DNA] suggests ... there is some sort of genetic code 
whereby information in DNA is written as a sequence of nucleotide pairs and translated 
into a different language of amino acid sequences in protein." D. SUZUKI, A. GRIFFITHS, 
J. MILLER & R. LEWONTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETICS ANALYSIS 192 (3rd ed. 1986). 
167. See 1981 Chakrabarty Patent for Microorganisms Having Multiple 
Compatible Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids (No.4,259,444); see also 
Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 968, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 197 (C.C.P.A. 
1979), affd, 447 U.S. 303 (1981) (if the genetic sequence of the plasmids were not com-
patible, the probability that the bacteria would survive was minimal). 
168. See 447 U.S. 303,310,100 S. Ct. 2204, 2208, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 
(1981) ("[T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different char-
acteristics from any found in nature .... His discovery was not nature's handiwork, 
but his own .... "). 
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reasoning to patent claims containing algorithms because they 
are also the product of human ingenuity. One can think of an 
algorithm as a combination of fundamental laws, i.e., addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, or as an expression of a funda-
mental law of nature, e.g., E=m~. However, once placed in a pro-
gram, an algorithm must be expressed in structured sequence 
of operations. 1s9 If this sequence is not properly constructed, the 
program will have no utility. Organizing an algorithm's sequence 
within a computer program requires human ingenuity, i.e. pro-
gramming. Deriving utility from human ingenuity should be the 
touchstone for finding algorithms amenable to patent protection. 
This approach has long been the standard espoused by the 
Supreme Court for determining whether a law of nature is the 
proper subject of a patent. 170 
169. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text. Many scholars and practi-
tioners alike argue that both algorithms and programs should be afforded only copy-
right protection because they are merely expressions ofideas. However, this is not the 
case. Utility should be the distinguishing characteristic for differentiating between 
a product that is copyrightable from one that is patentable. This Court could solve this 
apparent problem ifit would merely define the requisite utility required for an inven-
tion to be amenable to patent protection. 
For example, one could easily argue that a new nonobvious story expressed in a 
book is a patentable invention. Stories have a definite structure, e.g., a plot or a story-
line. An author expresses sentences in a definitive structure to convey the story. 
Obviously, the contents of the story are far different than anything that exists in 
nature. However, it is commonly understood that a book is merely an expression of 
ideas and not a useful article. This is an overly simplistic view standard. Any read-
er who enjoys a book obviously finds it useful for enjoyment. Yet, it is not the type of 
utility that affords stories patent protection. 
Examining algorithms, one easily finds that those algorithms recited in a word 
processing program are inherently useful when applied to a computer. This makes writ-
ing papers easier. Not all word processing programs are alike, e.g., some are both eas-
ier and have more ,functions, to use than others making thein more useful. The 
distinguishing characteristics between these programs is often the algorithms recit-
ed in them. Yet, as books, these algorithms are also expressions of ideas, and as such 
they are not patentable regardless of their utility. However, if these algorithms were 
tangible, there would be no question that they would be patentable. 
Perhaps physicality is not the proper touchstone for distinguishing between that 
which is copyrightable from that which is patentable. Rather, it should be utility. The 
author suggests that in the future, the Supreme Court should focus on the requisite util-
ity an invention must demonstrate in order to be amenable to patent protection. 
170. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1057,209 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) I, 8 (1981) ("an application of a law of nature or a mathematical 
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection"); 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co. 333 U.S. 127, 130,68 S. Ct. 440, 441 (1948) ("[i]fthere 
is to be invention for [a] discovery [of nature], it must come from the application of the 
law of nature to a new and useful end"); Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94, 59 
S. Ct. 427, 431 (1939) ("[w]hile a scientific truth, or a mathematical expression ofit, is 
not 'a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of 
knowledge of scientific truth may be"); Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853) 
("A patent will be good though the subject of the patent consists ... ofa ... law of nature 
if that principle is ... applied to ... a practical result and benefit not previously 
attained." (quoting the English case of Househill v. Nielson, Webster's Patent Cases 683». 
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Furthermore, Chakrabarty's focus on human ingenuity for 
determining whether an invention is the proper subject of a 
patent is wholly consistent with the statutory scheme for 
patent protection espoused in Graham. The Graham court 
interpreted the new condition of patentable novelty contained 
in the 1952 Act as embodying the standard set forth in 
Hotchkiss.l7l This standard focused on human ingenuity.172 
Thus, both Graham and Chakrabarty support the same prin-
ciple that the proper inquiry is on the extent of human inge-
nuity involved in the inventive process when determining 
patentable subject matter. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court's restrictive standard of patentability has caused 
considerable problems in the patent system concerning claims 
containing algorithms. Because the Diehr Court was wrong in 
interpreting the categories of patentable subject matter in 
section 101 as a separate and distinct requirement apart from 
the test of invention articulated in section 102-103, the Court 
should abolish its current approach of categorically precluding 
certain inventions from patent protection. This approach 
must give way, as it did in biotechnology patent law, to a more 
predictable standard of patentability: a focus on human inge-
nuity. This standard of review is more amenable to case prece-
dent and a less arbitrary standard of patentability than that 
currently used in computer technology patent law. Finally, this 
standard would assist the United States patent system in 
affording patent protection to those inventions most amenable 
to it: unforseen technologies. 
171. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. 
* Kenneth C. Brooks 
172. See Burchfiel, Rellising the ·Original· Patent Clause, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH., 
155, 167 (1989) Burchfiel explains that the essential inquiry to determine patentable 
novelty is whether the skill required to make the changes in an invention exceed the 
ordinary skill in the art. This skill required in nothing less than human intervention. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law Class of 1993. The author extends his 
gratification to Dominic Falasco for the performance of his duties as editor. 
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